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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1959 the Supreme Court of the United States held that it was
not a denial of due process of law for a state to try a man after he
had been acquitted of the same crime by the federal government;1 on
the same day.it also reaffirmed its position that a person first convicted
by a state may also be tried for the same crime by the federal govern-
ment without violating the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amend-
ment.2 Although, on the surface these decisions seem shocking, they
followed a long line of cases which lent support to them.3 Since these
decisions were the result of the interaction of the American federal
system and the protection against double jeopardy, it is necessary to
examine the history of both in order to understand the problems which
faced the Supreme Court.
* A.B., 1959, Cornell; LL.B., 1962, Harvard; Member of the New York Bar.
1. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959).
2. Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959); cf. United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S.
377 (1922).
3. E.g., Fox v. Ohio, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 410 (1847); United States v. Marigold, 50
U.S. (9 How.) 560 (1850); Moore v. Illinois, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 13 (1852); Hall v. Com-
monwealth, 197 Ky. 179, 246 S.W. 441 (1923); State v. Holm, 139 Minn. 267, 166 N.W.
181 (1918) ; see also cases cited in Bartkus v. Illinois, supra note 1.
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II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY
One of the oldest restraints on governmental power known to
Western civilization has been the prohibition against trying a man twice
for the same crime. Its beginnings can be traced at least back to Roman
times where a form of double jeopardy was forbidden.4 One of the
earliest English cases upholding the doctrine of double jeopardy was
Vaux's Case5 decided in 1591 during the reign of Elizabeth I. However,
there are authorities which trace the English development back to the
twelfth and thirteenth centuries.6 By the time of the American Constitu-
tional Convention, the sixth edition of Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown was
referring to the plea of autrefois acquit as a well accepted principle
of English law.7 Blackstone declared that the plea of autrefois acquit
was "grounded on this universal maxim of the common law of England."'
Moreover, the doctrine of double jeopardy was introduced to this
country by its earliest settlers. The Massachusetts Body of Liberties of
1641 declares that "No man shall be twise sentenced by Civill Justice
for one and the same Crime, offence or Trespass."9
Furthermore, the doctrine is familiar to systems of law other than
the common law. For example, the Napoleonic Code provided that "no
person legally acquitted can be a second time arrested or accused by
reason of the same act."1 The ancient Talmudic law also recognized a
form of double jeopardy."
Thus by 1791 when the Bill of Rights was incorporated into the
Constitution, there was a sizable body of law to which the double
jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment referred.12 Yet 171 years later,
as noted above, the freedom from double jeopardy has by no means
been secured.
III. CREATION OF A FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND ITS IMPACT ON THE
CONCEPT OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY
A. The Adoption of the Constitution
As Woodrow Wilson so aptly observed,
The question of the relation of the States to the federal govern-
4. RADIN, HANDBOOK OF ROMAN LAW 475 n.28 (1927).
5. 4 Co. Rep. 44(a), 76 Eng. Rep. 992 (K.B. 1591).
6. BROOKE, THE ENGLISH CHURCH AND THE PAPACY 205 (1952).
7. 2 HAWKINS, PLEAS Or THE CROWN 524 (6th ed. 1788), "sect. 1. And first of the
plea of autrefoits acquit which is grounded in this maxim (f) That a man shall not be
brought into danger of his life for one and the same offence more than once."
8. 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES* 335.*
9. BODY OF LIBERTIES, MASSACHUSETTS 43 (1641).
10. Wilfley, Trial by Jury and "Double Jeopardy" in the Philippines, 13 YALE L.J.
421, 424 (1904).
11. Newman, Double Jeopardy and the Problem of Successive Prosecutions: A Sug-
gested Solution, 34 So. CAL. L. REV. 252, 254 (1961).
12. U.S. CONST. amend. V, ". . . nor shall any person be subject for the same offence
to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb . ..."
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ment is the cardinal question of our constitutional system. At
every turn of our national development we have been brought
face to face with it, and no definition either of statesmen or of
judges has quieted or decided it.'"
After the signing of the Declaration of Independence in 1776, the
American colonies banded together to meet a common enemy. The
Articles of Confederation which were adopted in 1781 soon proved to
be a failure. The great defect of the confederation was the impotence
of the central government. Most of the states refused to pay the duties
levied on them and the central government had no legal means by
which to compel them to do so. Furthermore, the weakness of the central
government made it practically impossible to carry on foreign affairs.
Thus by 1785, the central government had virtually collapsed "shattered
by the blows received from the jealousy and particularism of the
individual states.'
' 4
Moreover, when the new Constitution was set up in 1787, the
comparative isolation of the states, their diverse social and economic
conditions, as well as their original independent status, caused them to
regard the maintenance of a high degree of local independence as of the
greatest importance. In order to secure this independence and at the
same time provide for a central government strong enough to provide
for their common interests, they resorted to the device of "federal
government.' 15
The new system of government was based on the proposition that
there should be two types of governments, each sovereign in its own
sphere. There were first the old state governments, which would maintain
all their former powers subject only to the enumerated powers in the
Constitution granted to the central government and those specifically
prohibited to the states, and second, the central government created
by the Constitution.'6 Hamilton, in The Federalist, declared,
An entire consolidation of the states into one complete national
sovereignty, would imply an entire subordination of the parts;
and whatever powers might remain in them, would be altogether
dependent on the general will. But as the plan of the convention
aims only at a partial union or consolidation, the state govern-
ments would clearly retain all the rights of sovereignty which
they before had, and which were not, by that act, exclusively
delegated to the United States.'
In effect, Hamilton was emphasizing the idea that sovereign states merely
13. WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 173 (1908).
14. MERRIAM, AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES 97 (1926).
15. GooDNow, PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT 32 (1916).
16. See, U.S. CONST. art. I §§ 8,9; U.S. CONST. amend. X.
17. THE FEDERALIST No. 32, at 169 (Scott ed. 1898) (Hamilton).
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delegated a part of their power to another government, but kept a large
part in reserve. This was made clear in the tenth amendment to the
Constitution. 8
B. Theory of Concurrent Jurisdiction
With the creation of a system of government whereby power was
divided between two sovereignties, it was essential that a method exist
whereby conflicts between the two could be resolved. Hamilton said that
the states alienated their sovereignty in only three cases:
where the constitution in express terms granted an exclusive
authority to the union; where it granted, in one instance, an
authority to the union; and in another, prohibited the states from
exercising the like authority; and where it granted an authority
to the union, to which a similar authority in the states would be
absolutely and totally contradictory and repugnant."9
Although both Hamilton2" and the Constitution2 tell us how to deal
with the question of conflicting laws, both leave open the question con-
cerning laws of duplication-that is, those situations in which both the
central and the state governments enact identical laws. Thus the courts
were faced with the task of solving this problem. In Cooley v. Board
of Wardens,1" the Supreme Court held that the states could not legislate
as to subjects which "are in their nature national or admit only of one
uniform system."22 Such subjects require the exclusive legislation of
Congress. However, subjects which are national in nature are exceedingly
rare in the criminal law. 3 Hence, it would be difficult for a court to
strike down a criminal statute under the Cooley doctrine.
Apart from the local-national distinction, the Supreme Court in
Houston v. Moore24 in 1820 adopted a doctrine whereby anytime the
federal government enacted a law dealing with the same subject as a
state law, the latter would be superseded. In that case, the State of
Pennsylvania provided for the punishment of militiamen who refused
18. U.S. CONST. amend. X, "The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or
to the people."
19. THE FEDERALIST Op. cit. supra, note 17 at 169.
20. Ibid.
21. U.S. CoNsT. article VI, cl. 2, "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; . . . shall be the supreme Law of the
Land . .. ."
21a. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
22. Id. at 319.
23. See Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956). Here Pennsylvania passed a law
making sedition against the United States a crime. Even with a statute which appears to
be national in nature the court said that "when the Federal Government has not occupied
the field and is not protecting the entire country from seditious conduct," the states may
enforce their sedition laws. Id. at 500.24. 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1 (1820).
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to serve when called into actual service by the President of the United
States. Congress had also passed a statute which prescribed punishment
for the same act. The plaintiff in error was tried before a court martial of
the state and convicted. He appealed on the ground that the state law
was contrary to the law of Congress and thus null and void. The court
did not unequivocally declare that if a state and the national government
legislate on the same topic the latter supersedes the former. Instead
it talked in the traditional terms of "repugnance ' '2 5 to the Constitution.
After saying that the states cannot enter upon the same ground and
punish for the same objects as Congress, the Court went on to declare
that:
The two laws may not be in such absolute opposition to each
other, as to render the one incapable of execution, without violat-
ing the injunctions of the other; and yet the will of the one
legislature may be in direct collision with that of the other....
Congress, for example, has declared, that the punishment for
disobedience of the act of congress, shall be a certain fine; if that
provided by the state legislature for the same offence be a similar
fine, with the addition of imprisonment or death, the latter law
would not prevent the former from being carried into execution,
and may be said, therefore, not to be repugnant to it. But surely
the will of congress is, nevertheless, thwarted and opposed. 6
.(Emphasis supplied.)
In 1849 -Mr. Justice McLean echoed the same views when he declared
that:
A concurrent power in two distinct sovereignties to regulate
the same thing is as inconsistent in principle as it is im-
practicable in action. It involves a moral and physical im-
possibility."
Although one would not expect to find the state courts supporting the
Houston doctrine of supersession, a few judges voiced their assent.
28
25. See text accompanying note 19 supra.
26. Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1, 22 (1820). The statement by the majority
of the court quoted above is dictum since the court sustained the conviction on the ground
that a state court martial was given concurrent jurisdiction to enforce the laws of Congress.
Id. at 32. In regard to the concurrent jurisdiction of the state court martial with that of
the United States court martial, the court went on to say, "the sentence of either court,
either of conviction or acquittal, might be pleaded in bar of the prosecution before the
other. . . ." Id. at 31. Mr. Justice Story although he dissented agreed with the majority
that there could be a plea in bar before a second court martial. Id. at 72. See also, Grant,
The Lanza Rule of Successive Prosecutions, 32 COLUM. L. REV. 1309 (1932).
27. The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 399 (1849).
28. State v. Antonio, 3 Brevard 562, 577; 2 Treadway 776, 802-03 (S.C. 1816). Justice
Nott of South Carolina said, "Now if the United States have the power to regulate the
value of. money and of foreign coin, and to provide for the punishment of counterfeiting
the current coin of the United States, they must have the exclusive jurisdiction; otherwise,
two governments equally sovereign and independent, would have jurisdiction over the same
subject . . . . The exercise of such authority by the States would be 'absolutely and totally
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But in spite of these pronouncements, the court soon began to develop
different theories of concurrent jurisdiction.
C. The Dual Sovereignty Theory
Twenty-seven years passed before the problem presented in Houston
v. Moore reached the Supreme Court again.2 9 In the meantime, however,
the state courts were formulating the proposition that since they had
jurisdiction over offenses committed within their boundaries, they could
not be deprived of it by the mere enactment of a federal statute on
the same 'subject. For example, in Harlan v. People,"° the defendant
was tried under a Michigan statute for counterfeiting coins. Pursuant
to its constitutional powers,3 ' Congress had also provided for the punish-
ment of counterfeiting. But the state court was quite vociferous in
exerting its jurisdiction over the offense. It pointed out that although
the Constitution gave Congress jurisdiction to coin money, that juris-
diction was exclusive only because the Constitution also prohibited the
states from doing so. Furthermore, the court said the Constitutional
grant of power to Congress to punish counterfeiters was not accompanied
by a corollary prohibition to the states; therefore such power could
not be exclusive. The court then declared that the power to punish crimes
was peculiarly local and that Congress, by its mere passage of similar
legislation, did not displace the State's jurisdiction.
It could be argued that the real basis for the court's decision was
that the statute of Congress punishing the crime of counterfeiting
granted jurisdiction to the states because it contained a proviso stating
that "nothing in this act contained, shall be construed to -deprive the
courts of the individual states of jurisdiction, under the laws of the
several states, over offences made punishable by -this act." 32 However,
the court refuted this argument by saying:
This is not giving jurisdiction to a state court by act of
Congress, to enforce a law of Congress. It is merely removing a
disability imposed, or which might be supposed to have been
imposed, by a previous act of Congress, and restoring to the
states the original jurisdiction over offences against state laws,
providing for the punishment of counterfeiting current coin. 3'
contradictory and repugnant' to the exercise of it by the United States." (Dissenting
opinion.) In Commonwealth v. Fuller, 49 Mass. (8 Metcalf) 313 (1844), the court side-
stepped the question of supersession by pointing out that the statute of Congress creating
the crime said, "that nothing in this act contained shall be construed to deprive the courts
of the individual States of jurisdiction, under the laws of the several States, over offences
made punishable by this act." Id. at 316. The court discussed Houston v. Moore, supra
note 24, but did not pass judgment on its reasoning.
29. Fox v. Ohio, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 410 (1847).
30. 1 Douglass 207 (Mich. 1843).
31. U.S. CoNsT. art..I, § 8, cl. 6, "To provide for the Punishment of counterfeiting the
Securities and current Coin of the United States."
32. 2 Stat. 404 ch. 49, § 4 (1806).
33. Harlan v. People, supra note 30, at 216. Cf. Commonwealth v. Fuller, supra note
1963]
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The argument is made more forcefully in State v. Randall.14
Randall clearly recognized that the states had jurisdiction to try counter-
feiters all along but that Congress could take away that jurisdiction if
it wished to do so. The court said that the proviso did not give the states
jurisdiction; it merely recognized an existing fact.
Thus, the difference between Houston on the one hand and Harlan
and Randall on the other, is that in Houston, the court believed that
an act of Congress automatically superseded a state law on the same
subject, while the judges in the latter cases believed that a Congressional
statute could supersede a state law only if Congress intended to do so.
Although the problem of successive federal and state prosecutions
could never have arisen had Houston been followed, that court's reason-
ing was unsound. It turned on the proposition that two distinct wills
could not be exercised against the same subject at the same time and
still be compatible with each other.8" But our whole federal system
depends on the opposite being true. If federal law automatically super-
seded all state laws on the same subject, the problems of enforcement
would be insurmountable. In the counterfeiting cases discussed above,
the states would have to depend on federal enforcement facilities to
protect their citizens against a localized crime. Thus, it seems that at
least from the standpoint of the state police power, the creation of the
doctrine of dual sovereignty was essential.
Moreover, the Supreme Court of the United States lent its support
to the dual sovereignty theory advanced by the states in the cases of
Fox v. Ohio,"0 United States v. Marigold, 7 and Moore v. Illinois.38
It is important to note that at the time these decisions came down (1847-
52), the nation was in the midst of the great slavery question and the
doctrine of state sovereignty was not merely a politico-legal question, but
a burning emotional one as well. Roger Taney, who was Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court from 1836-64, believed that the proper function
of the Court during this period was to arbitrate between the states and
the federal government. 9 His own theories on federal-state relations
placed him in an intermediate position between the two extremes of
28, which recognizes jurisdiction in the states over counterfeiting, but lays heavy stress on
the saving clause in the statute of Congress. Contra, Mattison v. State, 3 Mo. 421 (1834).
34. 2 Aikens 89 (Vt. 1827). "The necessary construction of this [proviso] is, that
congress admit, or concede the previous power of the states to enact laws, and their courts
to execute them, over this offence, and give jurisdiction to the Courts of the United States,
sub modo, and so as not to interfere with that previous jurisdiction of the state courts ...
The distinction between the conferring a jurisdiction by Congress, and the refusal to take
away a jurisdiction already enjoyed, is too obvious to require elucidation." Id. at 99.
35. Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1, 23 (1820).
36. 46 U.S. (5 How.) 410 (1847).
37. 50 U.S. (9 How.) 560 (1850).
38. 55 U.S. (14 How.) 13 (1852).
39. SmXTU, ROGER B. TANEY: JACKSONIAN JURIST 88 (1936).
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his day,4" and were in accord with those espoused in Fox, Marigold, and
Moore.4 In Ableman v. Booth he said:
And the powers of the General Government, and of the State,
although both exist and are exercised within the same territorial
limits, are yet separate and distinct sovereignties, acting
separately and independently of each other, within their respec-
tive spheres.42
Thus it appears that when the Supreme Court in Fox, Marigold
and Moore considered the problem of subjecting a man to the criminal
laws of two governments, it never really considered the question on its
merits-that is, it never balanced the interests of the respective govern-
ments against the rights of the individuals involved. Rather it was con-
cerned only with balancing the rights of the two governments. The
individual was only a sacrificial pawn in a game that had higher stakes-
the survival or demise of the federal union. Considering, then, the
jealousy of the states which attended the adoption of the Constitution,
and which strongly reasserted itself in the period between 1830 and the
Civil War, it was almost inevitable that the courts would evolve a
dual sovereignty theory.
D. Successive Prosecutions
Although the development of the dual sovereignty theory was
practically inevitable in the American system of government, it was by
no means necessary that the courts accept the principle of successive
prosecutions by the state and federal governments. And, in fact, the early
decisions were split on this issue. Basically there were three lines of
thought. First, in Fox v. Ohio, after stating for the purposes of argument
that both Congress and Ohio had jurisdiction over the crime, the Court
said that both had power to punish but that,
in the benignant spirit in which the institutions both of the
state and federal systems are administered, an offender who
should have suffered the penalties denounced by the one would
not be subjected a second time to punishment by the other for
acts essentially the same, unless indeed this might occur in
40. These were (1) John C. Calhoun who expressed the theory of one group by stating
that the Constitution of the United States was a compact between the States which had
established it as sovereigns and remained sovereign as parties to it. 1 WORKS OF CALHOUN,
277-78 (1858). (2) On the other end of the spectrum was Mr. Justice Story who said that
the Constitution was established by "the people of the United States, not the distinct
people of a particular state with the people of the other states," and that it was the irrevo-
cable and supreme law of the nation. See 1 STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION,
sec. 153 (1833).
41. Mr. Justice Daniel who rendered the opinions in Fox v. Ohio, supra note 36, and
in United States v. Marigold, supra note 37, was a strong states rights man. See generally,
BROWN, THE DiSSENTING OPINIONS OF MR. JUSTICE DANIEL, passim (1887).
42. 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506, 516 (1858).
UNIVERSITY .OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
instances of peculiar enormity, or where the public safety
demanded extraordinary rigor.'
The Court made clear however, that even if the "benignant spirit"
was somehow lacking, the governments still had power to punish
sucessively because the fifth amendment guarantee against double
jeopardy applied only to the situation where one government, that is,
the federal government, tries a defendant twice, not where two govern-
ments each try him once. 4
The second line of cases is illustrated by Moore v. Illinois, in which
the Court said:
Every citizen of the United States is also a citizen of a State or
territory. He may be said to owe allegiance to two sovereigns,
and may be liable to punishment for an infraction of the laws of
either. The same act may be an offence or transgression of the
laws of both. . . . That either or. both may (if they see fit)
punish such offender, cannot be doubted.4 5
Finally there are at least four state decisions in this period which
held that a prosecution by one government would bar a prosecution
by another. In one of them, State v. Randall, the court said:
But there is urged upon the Court the hardship, and even
absurdity, that a man should be liable to be arraigned before
two distinct tribunals, for the same offence. The difficulty in
this, like other concurrent jurisdictions, is rather imaginary than
real. The court that first has jurisdiction, by commencement
of the prosecution, will retain the same till a decision is made;
and a decision in one court will bar any further prosecution
for the same offence, in that or any other court.4"
Thus the door was left open for the states to assert their sovereignty and
still maintain the rights of the individual to protection against successive
prosecutions. Nevertheless, the vast majority of the courts followed
the Moore decision.
47
43. Fox v. Ohio, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 410, 435 (1847).
44. Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 250 (1833) held that the "fifth amend-
ment to the constitution, declaring that private property shall not be taken for public use,
without just compensation, is intended solely as a limitation on the exercise of power by the
government of the United States, and is not applicable to the legislation of the states." This
case has been broadly interpreted to mean that the Bill of Rights was intended to apply
to the federal government only. See Fox v. Ohio, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 410, 434 (1847) ; United
States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382 (1922).
45. Moore v. Illinois, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 13, 20 (1852) (dictum). Cf. vehement dissent
by Mr. Justice McLean. Id. at 21-22. State decisions in accord with Moore v. Illinois, supra;
State v. Brown, 2 N.C. 100 (1794) ; Chess v. State, 1 Blackford 198 (Ind. 1822).
46. 2 Aikens 89, 100-01 (Vt. 1827). Accord, State v. Antonio, 3 Brevard 562; 2 Tread-
way 776 (S.C. 1816) ; Commonwealth v. Fuller, 49 Mass. (8 Metcalf) 313 (1844); Harlan
v. The People, 1 Douglass 207 (Mich. 1843).
47. See cases cited in Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959) at 133-35.
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E. Comparison with the British Unitary System and the Canadian
Federal System
Although Britain has a unitary government, there are a few
instances in which statutes or treaties have created concurrent jurisdiction
over crimes committed abroad. For instance in The King v. Thomas,48
which arose under a 1534 statute49 vesting jurisdiction in the bordering
English county over felonies committed in Wales, but without sup-
pressing the Wales jurisdiction, the court held that an acquittal in Wales
was a plea in bar in England. Since the leading case of R. v. Hutchinson
was reported only partially,"0 it is necessary to resort to the cases in
which it was discussed in order to get the facts and rulings.5' Hutchinson
killed a man in Portugal and was. acquitted there under the local law
of a charge corresponding to murder. When he was tried in England
the court held that the acquittal was a bar to a new prosecution. Ac-
c6rding to the 'report in Gage v. Bulkeley,"2 the court did not seem to
base its decision on a rule of law, but rather seemed to leave to the
discretion of the trial judge whether or not' to bar a second prosecution.
In 1918, the case of Rex v. Aughet"4 was decided. Aughet was a
Belgian officer stationed in London. While in London he shot a Belgian
soldier. He was 'turned over to the Belgian .authorities pursuant to a
treaty which granted each government jurisdiction over its respective
armed forces wherever stationed, Upon acquittal, Aughet returned to
England and was tried there. Even though -the crimes under Belgian law
and English law were not exactly the same, the English court allowed
the plea of autrejois acquit. Again however, the court might not have
set down an absolute rule of law; rather it might have looked to the
intent of the treaty between the two nations:
We think that in these circumstances it would be contrary to
the true intent and meaning.of the Convention to subject the
man to punishment here for an offence for which he has been
in jeopardy and has been acquitted in accordance with Belgian
law.55
'48. 1 Sid. 179,'82 Eng. Rep. 1043 (in Norman French); I Lev. 118,' 83 Eng. Rep. 326;
1' Keb. 621, 83 Eng- Rep. 1147; 1 Keb. 663, 83 Eng. Rep. 1172 (K.B. 1662). All of these
reports must be consulted to secure a full account of the case.
49. 26 Hen. 8, c. 6, § 6 (1534).
50. 3 Keb. 785, 84 Eng. Rep. 1011 (K.B. 1678).
51. R. v. Hutchinson reported in Beak v. Thyrwhit, 3 Mod. 194, 87 Eng. Rep. 124
(K.B. 1688) ; and in Burrows v. Jemino, 2 Str. 733, 93 Eng. Rep. 815; and in Gage v.
Bulkeley, Ridg. T. Hard. 263, 27 Eng. Rep. 824 (Ch. 1744).
52. Gage v. Bulkeley, Ridg. T. Hard. 263, 272, 27 Eng. Rep. 824, 827 (Ch. 1744).
53. England had concurrent jurisdiction over this crime because the- court gave a
liberal reading to the statute of 33 Hen. 8, c. 23 (1541). See Gage v. Bulkeley, supra note
52, Ridg. T. Hard. at 272, Eng. Rep. at 827.
54. 26 Cox Crim. Cas. 232 (1918).
55. Id. at 238.
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But then the court went on to say:
The Convention does not affect or diminish the jurisdiction of
the King's courts over crimes committed in this country, but
where its provisions have been observed it would be unjust to
the prisoner not to accept a decision of a competent court in
his favor. 6
In any event, regardless of whether the British doctrine is a rule of law
or a rule construction, the fact remains that there are no reported English
cases which allow successive prosecutions.
5 7
The question still remains as to why the United States did not adopt
the English view. It is submitted that although the English do have a
concept of concurrent jurisdiction it is not the same as concurrent juris-
diction in a federal system. The common law in both the United States
and in England has established the territorial theory of jurisdiction over
crimes." In a federal system, if a crime is committed within the
boundaries of a state, by definition it is also committed within the
boundaries of the federal government. Thus it was easy to justify two
prosecutions by saying that the "peace and dignity" of two sovereigns
was offended and therefore two crimes were committed. 9 However,
this is not true in Britain. In that country two sovereigns do not have
territorial jurisdiction over a crime. Any concurrent jurisdiction must
be statutory or by treaty, not territorial.
No British subject can be tried under English law for an offense
committed on land abroad, unless there is a statutory provision to the
contrary.0° Thus, the English courts when trying a case pursuant to
concurrent jurisdiction conferred by statute or treaty, could not justify
double prosecutions because the "peace and dignity" of two sovereigns
had been offended.
Typically these statutes and treaties are designed to maintain order
along the borders of two countries where the jurisdiction of both may
be in doubt or to maintain discipline among mobile military troops61
In short, the device of concurrent jurisdiction is used for exceptional
situations only. The English can draw upon their general rule of bar-
ring a second prosecution to take care of the exception. In the United
56. Ibid.
57. For a discussion of the English cases, see Grant, Successive Prosecutions by State
and Nation: Common Law and British Empire Comparisons, 4 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 1 (1956).
58. See 39 HARV. L. REV. 492 (1926). Cf. Regina v. Ellis [1899) 1 Q.B. 230.
59. See e.g., United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382 (1922), where the court said,
"that an act denounced as a crime by both national and state sovereignties is an offense
against the peace and dignity of both, and may be punished by each."
60. ARCHBOLD, CRIMINAL PLEADING, EVIDENCE & PRACTICE, 28 (33rd ed. 1954).
61. See The King v. Thomas, 1 Sid. 179, 82 Eng. Rep. 1043; 1 Lev. 118, 83 Eng. Rep.
326; 1 Keb. 621, 83 Eng. Rep. 1147; 1 Keb. 663, 83 Eng. Rep. 1172 (K.B. 1662) ; and Rex
v. Aughet, 26 Cox. Crim. Cas. 232 (1918).
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States, on the other hand, there is no general rule barring two prosecutions
by different governments. Concurrent jurisdiction is the general rule,
and as we have seen above, it has been used to protect states' rights
rather than human rights. In the same vein, there has been no pressure
on the British Government to "prove" to a competing sovereign that it
too is sovereign as there has been on the American states. It seems that
without these problems confronting it, Britain has been able to con-
centrate on protecting the human rights involved.
An examination of the Canadian experience shows that although
it has a federal form of government it has solved the problem of succes-
sive prosecutions by declaring that in cases of overlap, Dominion law
supersedes Provincial law. 2 The reason lies in the development of
Canadian federalism. In the first place, the principal architect of the
Canadian union, John A. Macdonald, was an avowed centralizer. Be-
cause the British North America Act was drafted in 1864-67, he and the
men about him were greatly influenced by the Civil War in the United
States and were determined to avoid what they considered the errors of
the American Union-the major one being leaving to the states the
residuum of power.63 Thus, even though there were strong sectional
interests, such as the French minority in Quebec, the framers designed
a central government which was to be superior to those of the Provinces.
Therefore various controls were placed in the hands of the Dominion-
nomination of the judges, appointment of the lieutenant-governors,
the right to disallow provincial legislation and of course the reservation
of the residuum of power to the central government.64
Thus, it has been said that:
The underlying theory of Canadian federalism may . . . be
summarized by saying that a single political power distributes
its energy through two groups of institutions, some national and
others provincial.65
Hence, although Canada has a federal system it is based upon a unitary
principle whereas federalism in the United States is based on a principle
of dualism.6 6 Furthermore, one of the most obvious examples of this
distinction is the area of the criminal law. As we have already seen, the
machinery, judicial, legislative and executive, for administering the
62. See e.g., Rex v. Hanel, 45 Can. Cr. Cas. 381 (1925).
63. See LOWER, EVOLVING CANADIAN FEDERALISM, 20-1 (1958); The British North
America Act, 30 & 31 Vict. c. 3 (1867), which is the Canadian Constitution grants the
residuum of powers to the Dominion government. "It shall be lawful for the Queen ...
to make Laws for the Peace, Order, and Good Government of Canada, in relation to all
Matters not coming within the Classes of Subjects by this Act assigned exclusively to the
Legislatures of the Provinces . . . . Id. sec. 91.
64. LOWER, op. cit. supra note 63, at 20-1.
65. SMITH, FEDERALISM IN NORTH AMERICA 10 (1923).
66. Id. at 11.
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criminal law is completely duplicated in the state and federal system
of the United States.
However, in Canada, the constitution sets up a different system.
The Dominion is given exclusive legislative authority over the criminal
law, 7 while the Provinces are given exclusive legislative authority to
create penalties for the violation of statutes pertaining to local order
such as control of street traffic. 8 Hence, as far as the general criminal
law is concerned, Canadians are used to looking to the Dominion Parlia-
ment. It is only when civil crimes and misdemeanors are concerned that
Canadians turn to provincial law. When the inevitable situation arose
whereby the Dominion enacted a traffic law, the provincial courts were
not concerned with maintaining their "sovereignty"; they had long
since recognized the supremacy of the Dominion.
Thus, in Rex v. Hanel,"9 the Dominion passed a statute penalizing
persons driving while intoxicated. The Province of Quebec had a similar
statute. The defendant was tried under the Quebec statute and was
convicted. He appealed on the theory that the Dominion statute super-
seded that of the Province and his position prevailed. The Crown argued
that:
By s. 92(8) & (15) [of the British North America Act] the
Provincial Legislatures are given exclusive power to make laws
relative to municipal institutions within the Province and to
impose fines, penalties or imprisonment in aid of the enforce-
ment of any law of the Province applying to the matters
enumerated in s. 92.70
In effect, the Crown contended that to allow the Quebec law to be
superseded would be to allow the Dominion to override an exclusive
grant of power to the Provinces. However, the' court rejected this argu-
ment and declared that the Dominion was within its legislative authority
in enacting this statute' because of its power to. enact criminal laws. 71
It said that there can be a domain in which the powers of the Dominion
and Provincial legislatures may overlap and that ifthe field is not clear
and the two legislatures meet in this domain, the Dominion legislature
must prevail.
72
67. British North America Act, 30 & 31 Vict. c. 3 (1867). "[T]he exclusive Legislative
Authority of the Parliament of Canada extends to . . . (27) The Criminal Law, except the
Constitution of Courts of Criminal Jurisdiction, but including the Procedure in Criminal
Matters." Supra § 91.
68. "In each Province the Legislature may exclusively make Laws . . . that is to
say. . . . (15) The Imposition of Punishment by Fine, Penalty or Imprisonment for en-
forcing any Law of the Province made in relation to any Matter coming within any of the
Classes of Subjects enumerated in this Section." British North American Act, 30 & 31 Vict.
c. 3, § 91 (1867).
69. 45 Can. Cr. Cas. 381 (1925).
70. Id. at 386.
71. British North America Act, 30 & 31 Vict. c. 3, § 91 (1867).
72. Rex v. Hanel, 45 Can. Cr. Cas. 381, 389 (1925). Accord: Rex v. Chapman, 66 Can.
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Even though the Canadian federal system could produce this
decision without any apparent hesitation, the American federal system,
because of certain essential differences, could not.
For example, if the United States adopted the doctrine of super-
session, this would place the states in the awkward position of not being
able to keep order until the federal government acted to enforce its
law. But Canada does not possess a completely dual system of courts as
in the United States. The constitution gives the Provinces the power to
create criminal courts, not the Dominion.7" Thus the provincial courts
are able to administer justice regardless of the source of law being
enforced, whether Dominion or provincial. 74
Further, Canada's federal system is in a sense the reverse of that
in the United States. The residuum of power lies with the central govern-
ment while in the United States, the residuum lies with the states. Also,
because the Canadian constitution gives the Dominion, among other
things, power to appoint provincial lieutenant-governors and power to
overrule provincial legislation, the people are accustomed to recognizing
the supremacy of the federal government. 76 Because of these reasons
when the relatively rare problem of concurrent jurisdiction comes up,
the courts are able to resolve it in favor of the Dominion government
without even reaching the question of double jeopardy.
Hence, because the British and Canadian historical experiences
have been different from that of the United States, our courts have
not drawn on the precedents available from these countries. While
the courts have been correct in assuming that the American federal
system creates its own peculiar problems, they have been content with
the results that system produces and have made no endeavor to find
better solutions.
IV. ACCEPTANCE OF SUCCESSIVE FEDERAL AND STATE PROSECUTIONS
BY THE MODERN COURTS
When Bartkus v. Illinois77 and Abbate v. United States78 were
L.R. 72 (1922); Re Rex v. Drolet, [1925] 2 D.L.R. 326; Rex v. Ottenson, 40 Man. 95
(1931). For a discussion of these cases, see Grant, Successive Prosecutions by State and
Nation: Common Law and British Empire Comparisons, 4 U.C.L.A.L. RaV. 1, 16 (1956).
73. British North America Act, 30 & 31 Vict. c. 3 (1867), at § 91 grants the Dominion
power over the Criminal Law, "(27) . . . except the Constitution of Courts of Criminal
Jurisdiction . . . ." Section 92 grants to the Provinces the power over "(14) The Administra-
tion of Justice in the Province, including the Constitution, Maintenance, and Organization
of Provincial Courts . . . of Criminal Jurisdiction .
74. CLOKIE, CANADIAN GOVERNMENT AND PoLrrlcs 224 (1944).
75. These powers have rarely been used.
76. E.g., Mr. Justice Frankfurter in referring to the English precedents said, "Such
precedents are dubious also because they reflect a power of discretion vested in English
judges not relevant to the constitutional law of our federalism." Bartkus v. United States,
359 U.S. 121, 128 n.9 (1959).
77. 359 U.S. 121 (1959); see note 1 supra and accompanying text.
78. 359 U.S. 187 (1959); see note 2 supra and accompanying text.
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decided in 1959, the Supreme Court had an opportunity to reexamine
the whole doctrine of successive prosecutions at a period in history when
civil liberties were not being lightly dismissed when they clashed with
"anti-libertarian" state interests.79 Furthermore the Court need not have
gone to the extreme of adopting the Houston doctrine of supersession;80
it could have concentrated its efforts on giving meaning to the protection
against double jeopardy once one sovereign had already prosecuted. The
Court chose to do otherwise.
A. Bartkus v. Illinois
In Bartkus, the petitioner was tried and acquitted in a federal
court for a violation of a federal statute which makes it a crime to rob
a federally insured bank. On substantially the same evidence, he was
later tried and convicted in an Illinois state court for violation of an
Illinois robbery statute."' On certiorari from the state court, the Supreme
Court affirmed the conviction.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, who delivered the opinion of the Court,
stated that the second prosecution could be unconstitutional only if the
fourteenth amendment restrictions on state power incorporated by
reference the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment.8 " The
general test was set down by Mr. Justice Cardozo in Palko v. Con-
necticut8M and is as follows:
In these and other situations immunities that are valid as against
the federal government by force of the specific pledges of
particular amendments have been found to be implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty, and thus, through the Fourteenth
Amendment, become valid as against the states.84
Yet Frankfurter never inquired as to whether a state prosecution after
a federal acquittal was contrary to the "concept of ordered liberty."8
79. E.g., Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1954) (school desegregation
cases); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (a state cannot introduce into evidence the
fruits of an illegal search and seizure) ; Baker v. Carr, 82 Sup. Ct. 691 (1962) (legislative
reapportionment).
80. See note 24 supra and accompanying text.
81. People v. Bartkus, 7 Ill. 2d 138, 130 N.E.2d 187 (1955).
82. Since the decision in Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937), the Court has been
consistent in saying that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment does not
automatically include all of the Bill of Rights. Frankfurter, in the Bartkus case, examined
the history of the adoption of the fourteenth amendment and says that the framers did
not intend to include the Bill of Rights. Black and Douglas, J.J. are noted for their strong
and persistent dissents, which argue for automatic inclusion. See their dissent in Bartkus v.
Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 151 n.1 (1959).
83. 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
84. Id. at 324-25. (Emphasis added.)
85. This question was asked in Palko v. Connecticut, supra note 83. There a statute
gave the state the right to appeal in criminal cases. The Court asked, "Is that kind of
double jeopardy to which the statute has subjected him a hardship so acute and shocking
that our polity will not endure it?" 302 U.S. at 328. Although it answered in the negative,
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Instead he examined the historical development of the successive prosecu-
tions doctrine and discovered that before Fox v. Ohio was decided, the
courts were split as to whether or not to bar second prosecutions.8"
He then seemed to conclude that merely because some courts approved
the theory of successive prosecutions, that theory could not, by the very
fact of approval, be contrary to the "concept of ordered liberty." His
statement is as follows:
Conflicting opinions concerning the applicability of the plea in
bar may manifest conflict in conscience. They certainly do not
manifest agreement that to permit successive state and federal
prosecutions for different crimes arising from the same acts
would be repugnant to those standards of outlawry which
offend the conception of due process outlined in Palko.87
This argument might have had some weight had these courts given
reasoned opinions on the issue at bar. However, two of the courts were
concerned with different problems88 and the other two never really coped
with the issue.89 After continuing to cite a massive body of precedent he
stated:
With this body of precedent as irrefutable evidence that
state and federal courts have for years refused to bar a second
trial even though there had been a prior trial by another govern-
ment for a similar offense, it would be disregard of a long,
unbroken, unquestioned course of impressive adjudication for
the court now to rule that due process compels such a bar.9"
it went on to say, "What the answer would have to be if the state were permitted after a
trial free from error to try the accused over again or to bring another case against him, we
have no occasion to consider." Ibid.
86. Frankfurter cites four cases denying a bar to a second trial. State v. Brown, 2
N.C. 100 (1794); Mattison v. State, 3 Mo. 421 (1834); Hendrick v. Commonwealth, 5
Leigh 707 (Va. 1834) ; State v. Tutt, 2 Bailey 44 (S.C. 1830). See Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S.
121, 129-130 (1959).
87. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 131 (1959).
88. In State v. Brown, 2 N.C. 100 (1794), the defendant stole a horse in a federal
territory and brought it to North Carolina. The court held that the taking and the asporta-
tion were part of the same crime and thus defendant could only be tried under federal,
not state law. Upon assuming that the asportation was a new crime, the court said, there
could then be two trials. The federal government could try for the taking and the state
for the asportation. Thus this court would allow successive trials only if there were two
different substantive offenses. In Mattison v. State, 3 Mo. 421 (1834), the court feared that
a state could pass a law creating a minor penalty and thus subvert a federal law which
created harsh penalties. In such a case, there would be no bar. Once again this is a different
problem from that faced in Bartkus. (Frankfurter does deal with this problem later in his
opinion. Bartkus v. Illinois, supra at 137).
89. Hendrick v. Commonwealth, 5 Leigh 707 (Va. 1834) refers to the problem of
double prosecutions. In an attempt to justify double prosecutions, it says that both the
state and the federal government have jurisdiction to try the crime of forgery of a check
of the bank of the United States. Id. at 713. The court never faced the question of whether
a trial by one government would bar the other. The same analysis can also be made for
State v. Tutt, 2 Bailey 44 (S.C. 1830).
90. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 136 (1959).
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In short, according to Mr. Justice Frankfurter, a prosecution by a state
court after a federal acquittal is not a violation of the fourteenth
amendment because a great many courts said it isn't!
Thus, only the dissenters really considered the question of whether
or not successive prosecutions by different governments for what is
essentially the same offense, was a violation of the fourteenth amendment.
For Mr. Justice Black the question was easily answered:
For I think double prosecutions for the same offense are so
contrary to the spirit of our free country that they violate
even the prevailing view of the Fourteenth Amendment, ex-
pressed in Palko v. Connecticut .... 91
Justice Black further said:
Looked at from the standpoint of the individual who is being
prosecuted, this notion [of the Court] is too subtle for me to
grasp. If double punishment is what is feared, it hurts no less
for two 'Sovereigns' to inflict it than for one. If danger to the
innocent is emphasized, that danger is surely no less when the
power of State and Federal Governments is brought to bear on
one man in two trials, than when one of these 'Sovereigns'
proceeds alone. 2
A close analysis of the majority opinion yields what the author be-
lieves to be Justice Frankfurter's real reasons for upholding the state
conviction. Frankfurter has always believed that state action should be
struck down only after great hesitation and reflection. He has been wary
of excessive federal legislative and judicial power over objects tradi-
tionally within the sphere of the states.9" Near the end of his opinion
he stated:
Time has not lessened the concern of the Founders in
devising a federal system which would likewise be a safeguard
against arbitrary government. The greatest self-restraint is
necessary when that federal system yields results with which a
court is in little sympathy.94
Justice Frankfurter concluded by saying that successive prosecutions
are a matter of concern although they do not violate due process, but
that the states, not the Supreme Court, are the proper parties to deal
with the problem. It seems that Justice Frankfurter, having realized the
grave problems of criminal law adminstration which would arise if
successive state and federal prosecutions for the same offense were
91. Id. at 150-51.
92. Id. at 155. (Emphasis added.)
93. Cf. West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (dissent)
Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945) (dissent).
94. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 137-8 (1959).
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proscribed by the due process clause,95 has delegated to the state
legislatures what the author considers to be a proper judicial function.
There. is no dispute over the fact that the Supreme Court is the interpreter
of the due process clause. It is true that a part of that interpretive
process requires a delicate balancing of interests. However, this does
not mean that the Court should shy away from declaring conduct a
violation merely because doing so will create difficult administrative
problems."6
B. Abbate v. United States
Abbate was convicted in an Illinois state court for violating a state
statute making it a crime to conspire to injure the property of another
and was sentenced to three months imprisonment. Thereafter, because of
the same conspiracy, he was convicted in a federal. district court for
violating a federal statute97 by conspiring to violate 18 U.S.C. § 1362,
which forbids the injury or destruction of communications facilities
"operated or.controlled by the United States.".
The major difference between Abbate and Bartkus is that in the
former a federal court tried the petitioner after the state court had.
Thus there was no question as to whether -the fourteenth amendment
incorporated the proscription against double jeopardy found in the
fifth. The fifth amendment itself was involved. Mr. Justice Brennan,
speaking for the Court, affirmed the conviction relying on United States
v. Lanza. 8 That court said:
The Fifth Amendment, like all the other guaranties in the first
eight amendments, applies only to proceedings by the Federal
Government, .. . and the double jeopardy therein forbidden
is a second prosecution under authority of the Federal Govern-
ment after a first trial for the same offense under the same au-
thority. Here the same act was an offense against* the State of
Washington, because a violation of its law, and also an offense
against the United States [under its law]. The defendants thus
committed two different offenses by the same act, and a con-
viction by a court of Washington of the offense -against that
State is not a conviction of the different offense against the
United States and so is not double jeopardy.
99
In effect the court said that the United States only placed the defendant
in jeopardy once. The fact that another government had also placed him
in jeopardy was none of its affair.
95. These problems are discussed in Chapters IV & V infra.
96. For another criticism of the Bartkus case, see 44 MiNN. L. REV. 534 (1960). A
student note in sympathy with Bartkus can be found at 45 CORNELL L.Q. 574 "(1960).
97. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1958).
98. 260 U.S. 377 (1922). For an extended discussion of this case see Grant, The Lanza
Rule of Successive Prosecutions, 32 CoLuvm. L. R~v. 1309 (1932).
99. United States v. Lanza, supra note 98, at 382.
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This of course is a possible interpretation of the double jeopardy
clause. However, the Supreme Court, which is often meticulous in
examining the intent of the Founding Fathers, did not do so this time.1°°
At the time the fifth amendment was under consideration the double
jeopardy clause read:
No person shall be subject, except in cases of impeachment, to
more than one punishment or one trial for the same of-
fense . .. .o0
A delegate moved to have the clause changed to read,
No person shall be subject, except in cases of impeachment, to
more than one punishment or one trial for the same offense
by any law of the United States.102
This amendment was rejected. While this bit of legislative history is by
no means conclusive, a diligent court should have discussed the point.
Neither Lanza' ° nor Abbate did. Further, even if the Court's interpreta-
tion of the double jeopardy clause is correct, it failed to consider the
applicability of the due process clause of the fifth amendment. Even
though in Abbate the federal government did not itself place the defend-
ant in jeopardy twice, under Justice Black's reasoning in Bartkus he
was denied due process of law. °4
The Abbate case does raise one problem that is worth discussion at
this point. The defendant committed the act of conspiracy in Illinois, but
the act was to have been consummated by destroying property in Mis-
sissippi, Tennessee, and Louisiana. Under the Illinois statute'0 5 the
court had discretion to imprison him for five years, but it only sentenced
him to three months. Justice Brennan contended that to allow this very
light sentence by the state court to bar a federal prosecution which could
100. Mr. Justice Black did, however. See Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 201
(1959) (dissent).
101. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 434 (1789-91) [1789-1824].
102. Id. at 753. (Emphasis added.)
103. Although some commentators say that the basis of the Lanza opinion which
arises under the Prohibition amendment is that the second section of the eighteenth amend-
ment grants the states concurrent jurisdiction, the Court specifically refutes this argument.
"To regard the Amendment as the source of the power of the States to adopt and enforce
prohibition measures is to take a partial and erroneous view of the matter." United States
v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 381 (1922). Cf. 22 GA. BAR J. 392, 399 (1959-60).
104. Cf. text accompanying notes 91 & 92 supra.
105. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 139 (1957), "If any two or more persons conspire or
agree together, . . . with the fraudulent or malicious intent wrongfully and wickedly
to injure the . . . property of another, . . . or to commit any felony, they shall be deemed
guilty of a conspiracy; . . . and every person convicted of conspiracy at common law,
shall be fined not exceeding $2,000 or shall be imprisoned in the county jail not exceeding
one year, or shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary for a term of not less than one year
and not exceeding five years, or may be so fined and so imprisoned in the county jail or
penitentiary." The statute applies to conspiracies in Illinois to destroy property outside the
state. See People v. Buckminster, 282 Il. 177, 118 N.E. 497 (1917).
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result in a five year sentence, 1 6 would be to impair the efficiency of fed-
eral law enforcement . 7 Brennan feared that the Illinois state court
did not consider the offense as seriously as it might have, since the con-
spiracy was to be consummated, not in Illinois, but in three other states.
As he pointed out, "such a disparity will very often arise when, as in
this case, the defendants' acts impinge more seriously on a federal interest
than on a state interest."'" 8 However, this statement is not completely
accurate. The legislature set a penalty almost as strict as that set in the
federal statute, 10 9 showing that at least the legislative branch of the
state considered that a serious state interest was harmed. It seems, then,
that Brennan's statement is based solely on the sentence imposed by the
trial judge. Since judges traditionally have broad discretion to consider
many factors when sentencing a prisoner, a judge should not draw the
inferences Justice Brennan did, without adequate proof before him that
the courts of the state considered the interests of Illinois to be so differ-
ent that in reality two offenses were committed.
The Lanza case also mentions a problem analogous to the one con-
fronting Justice Brennan. The court hypothesized that if a state were
to punish a crime by small or nominal fines, the race of offenders to the
state courts to plead guilty and secure immunity from federal prosecution
would not lead to respect for the federal statutes or for their deterrent
effect." 0 But a strong argument can be made to the contrary; that is, if
the first trial is a mock trial, then the defendant never was in jeopardy
and can be tried again."' In its brief in Abbate the Government met this
argument by stating that the problems of proving collusion are so great
that in most instances they are insurmountable." 2 However true this may
be, it does not follow that successive prosecutions always should be
permitted, even when there is no collusion. In order to solve this problem,
it is necessary to weigh the rights of the individual against double punish-
ment against the rights of a government to protect itself against collusive
prosecutions by another government. In all probability, collusive prosecu-
tions are very rare, and if in a particular case collusion cannot be proved,
then the proscription against double jeopardy should apply. This is not
shocking in a system of criminal law which always gives the benefit of
doubt to the defendant. 13
106. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1958) provides, "If two or more persons conspire . . . to commit
any offense against the United States, . . . and one or more of such persons do any act
to effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall be fined not more than $10,000 or im-
prisoned not more than five years, or both."
107. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 195 (1959).
108. Ibid.
109. See notes 105 and 106, supra.
110. United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 385 (1922).
111. See Grant, Successive Prosecutions by State and Nation: Common Law and
British Empire Comparisons, 4 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 1, 3 n.6 (1956).
112. Brief for the United States, pp. 43-44, Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187
(1959).
113. CI. State v. Lawrence, 120 Utah 323, 234 P.2d 600 (1951). "However, under our
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Furthermore, it is unlikely that a race of offenders will ever develop.
Unless we assume that criminals are always in league with the police, it
is unlikely that a criminal will turn himself in to the state authorities in
the hope of receiving a minor sentence and by this means bar a federal
trial. Practically speaking, he will hope to escape the clutches of the law
altogether. The possibilities of collusion then, should not be a reason
to allow all successive state-federal prosecutions. It should only mean
that in the proper case, collusive practices if proved, should permit a
second prosecution.
Although they are distinguishable, it is interesting to note that
neither Bartkus nor Abbate made any mention of two cases in which the
Supreme Court did recognize a bar against successive prosecutions. In
United States v. Furlong,"4 the Court declared:
Robbery on the seas is considered as an offence within the
criminal jurisdiction of all nations. It is against all, and punish-
able by all; and there can be no doubt that the plea of autrefois
acquit would be good, in any civilized state, though resting on a
prosecution instituted in the courts of any other civilized
state." 5
Almost 100 years later, the Supreme Court decided the case of Nielson
v. Oregon."' Congress had given the States of Oregon and Washington
concurrent jurisdiction over the Columbia River. By way of dictum, the
Court said:
Where an act is malum in se prohibited and punishable by the
laws of both States, the one first acquiring jurisdiction of the.
person may prosecute the offense, and its judgment is a finality
in both States, so that one convicted or acquitted in the courts
of one State cannot be prosecuted for the same offense in the
courts of the other."
7
The concurrent jurisdiction in both these cases is similar to that of
the English cases discussed above."" They are not cases in which two
governments always have territorial jurisdiction over the subjects in-
volved. Rather they are examples of situations in which the legislature
has tried to correct a situation whereby two or more governments might
come into conflict on certain occasions. In fact the Nielsen Court said:
Undoubtedly one purpose, perhaps the primary purpose, in the
grant of concurrent jurisdiction was to avoid any nice question
jury system, it is traditional that in criminal cases juries can, and sometimes do, make
findings which are not based on logic, nor even common sense." Id. at 330, 234 P.2d at 603.
114. 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 184 (1820).
115. Id. at 197 (dictum).
116. 212 U.S. 315 (1909).
117. Id. at 320.
118. See text, notes 48-61 supra.
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as to whether a criminal act sought to. be prosecuted was com-.
mitted on one side or the other of the exact boundary in the
channel, that boundary sometimes changing by reason of the
shifting of the channel." 9
Even though these two cases are distinguishable from Bartkus and
Abbate, the courts in barring a second prosecution did not worry about
the "race of offenders" nor about one state "thwarting" the law of another
although the possibilities were equally present.
In summary, Bartkus and Abbate were concerned with only one
problem, that of balancing the interests of the administration of the
criminal laws of two governments. In the interests of preventing friction
the Supreme Court believed that it was better to try a man twice than
have one government usurp the powers of another. The Court was quite
cognizant of the fact that.if it had ruled otherwise, it would have created
many new problems of criminal administration. It is submitted that these
problems, although difficult,. can be solved, and therefore the rights of
the individual defendants. should have been protected.
V,. SUGGESTIONS FOR A JUDICIAL SOLUTION
A. The Present Interpretation of the Double Jeopardy Clause
The double jeopardy clause provides that no person shall be twice
put in jeopardy "for the same offence." However, the courts have con-
sistently held that because of the sole fact that a man commits an act
that is made a crime by two sovereigns, he is deemed to have.committed
two distinct offenses and may be punished by each sovereign: The tradi-
tional justification for this holding is, "that an act denounced as a crime
by both national and state sovereignties is an offense against the peace
and dignity of both and may be punished by each."" 2 However, this
argument fails to hold up under scrutiny. This "peace and dignity" is not
something which belongs to each sovereign and which may be coveted by
each. In reality, this "peace and dignity" represents the interests of
society, which the two governments were given concurrent jurisdiction
to protect. An "offense against the peace and dignity" of a sovereign
is not really an offense against the sovereign itself, but against the society
which the sovereign protects. Further, the states and federal government
do not protect separate societies. The federal government protects the
same society as does the state. This protection overlaps in the same
manner as does the jurisdiction. Thus, when an act is committed which
violates the laws of two sovereigns, no offense is committed against the
"peace and dignity of both"; rather the offense has been committed
against one society. The only unusual factor is that our federal system
119. Nielsen v. Oregon, 212 U.S. 315, 320 (1909).
120. United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382 (1922).
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has created two sovereigns with jurisdiction to protect that society and
punish "for the same offence." Under this theory, then, successive prose-
cutions by the state and federal governments to vindicate the same social
interest is in effect to try a man twice for the same offense, and there-
fore should be a violation of due process of law.' 2 '
Since the cases which have dealt with successive prosecutions by
state and federal governments have automatically allowed double prosecu-
tions without further inquiry, it is necessary to turn to cases involving
only a single jurisdiction to see how the courts have interpreted the
phrase "for the same offense" found in the double jeopardy clause. There
are two tests in use today-the "same evidence" test, and the "same
transaction" test.
The majority of the courts use the ."same evidence" test which
originated in The King v. Vandercomb.'" In its most common form,
this test permits multiple indictments except where the same proof will
sustain a conviction under both the first and the second indictments.
For instance, in the leading case 28 espousing this theory, the de-
fendant committed one act; that is, he made a sale of morphine to one
person, but in doing so he violated two different statutory provisions. 24
The Court declared that:
Each of the offenses created requires proof of a different ele-
ment. The applicable rule is that where the same act or trans-
action constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions,
the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses
or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact
which the other does not. 2 5
Furthermore, the courts have continued to use the "same evidence" test
to justify multiple trials in situations where a person commits two or
more illegal acts which injure two or more persons or their property
during the same occurrence. For example, in Hoag v. New Jersey,1' the
defendant was tried and acquitted for the robbery of three persons on
the same occasion. Subsequently he was tried and convicted for robbing
121. Oddly enough, it may not be a violation of the double jeopardy clause itself
since that has been interpreted to apply only when the federal government itself prosecutes
a person twice. See text accompanying notes 98 and 99 supra. For an application of the
6social interest" theory to multiple prosecutions, see Kirchheimer, The Act, The Offense
and Double Jeopardy, 58 YALE L.J. 513 (1949).
122. 2 Leach 708, 168 Eng. Rep. 455 (Ex. 1796).
123. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
124. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 4704 forbids the sale of narcotics except in or from
the original stamped package. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 4705 forbids the sale of narcotics
not in pursuance of a written order of a person to whom the drug is sold.
125. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932). For cases in accord, see
A.L.I., ADmiN. or CRni. LAW: DOUBLE JEOPARDY § 5, commentary pp. 26-9 (1935).
126. 356 U.S. 464 (1958) ; see also Ciucci v. Illinois, 356 U.S. 571 (1958). For a discus-
sion of these cases see 1958 ILL. L.F. 472.
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a fourth person during the same occurrence. The court accepted the fact
that under the "same evidence" test used by the New Jersey court, each
robbery was a separate offense and thus could be punished separately.
It then went on to declare that it was not a violation of due process
to prosecute for each robbery in separate trials.27
On the other hand, a few courts have adopted the "same transaction"
test. In State v. Mowser,128 the defendant had been previously convicted
of robbery. He was then put on trial for the killing of the victim of the
robbery-the killing being felony-murder. The court held that the con-
viction of robbery barred a new trial for felony-murder, saying:
When such integral part of the principal offense is not a distinct
affair, but grows out of the same transaction, then an acquittal
or conviction of an offender for the lesser offense will bar a
prosecution for the greater.1n
However, by the use of the term "same transaction," the court does not
mean that it is necessary to try all the illegal acts which defendant com-
mitted during the same time sequence. Instead, all the court said was,
"The legislature has made the crime of robbery a constituent element of
murder in the first degree . . . 2111' It is the act of robbery which is
made the basis of the murder charge, and in this sense it is all one
transaction. 8'
It is interesting to note that no state adopts one test or the other;
rather they use the two interchangeably in the hope of coming to an
equitable solution in the particular case.3 2 Few courts have yet adopted
a test whereby they look to the intent of the legislature and try to deter-
mine just what interests it is trying to protect. Instead the courts seem
to presume that because the legislature enacts several statutes, it intends
that all should be cumulatively applicable. 13
127. Accord, A.L.I. op. d. supra note 125, § 22. "If a person is acquitted or convicted
of an offense he shall not again be prosecuted for a violation of the same provision of the
criminal law committed in the same transaction unless the acts done by him took effect on
more than one person or the property of more than one person . . . ." For cases in
accord, see A.L.I., supra, § 22, commentary pp. 162-65.
128. 92 N.J.L. 474, 106 Atl. 416 (1919).
129. Id. at 483, 106 Atl. at 420.
130. Id. at 482, 106 Atl. at 419.
131. In Spannell v. State, 83 Tex. Crim. 418, 203 S.W. 357 (1918), defendant fired
several shots and killed two people. Since he only intended to kill one, the single intent
encompassed both shots and thus there was only one transaction and only one trial could
be had. For other cases in accord, see A.L.I., op. cit. supra note 125, pp. 29-30. For a dis-
cussion of the "same transaction" test see Lugar, Criminal Law, Double Jeopardy, and
Res Judicata, 39 IOWA L. REv. 317, 323 (1954). Cf. 65 YALE L.J. 339 (1956).
132. Note that New Jersey used the "same evidence" test in Hoag v. New Jersey, 356
.U.S. 464 (1958), supra note 126, and the "same transaction" test in State v. Mowser, 92
N.J.L. 474, 106 At. 416 (1919) supra note 128. See also, Lugar, supra note 131, at 325-29.
133. See 65 YAU L.J. 339, 346 (1956). See also Kirchheimer, The Act, The Offense and
Double Jeopardy, 58 YALE L.J. 513 (1949) for an excellent discussion of this point.
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B. Proposals to Prevent Successive Prosecutions "for the Same Offence"
As we have seen, the federal government enacts laws to protect the
same society and therefore the same social interests as does the state.
Merely because both Congress and the state legislatures take it upon
themselves to define a crime does not mean that each crime is a different
'"offense." It seems highly unlikely that at the time this phrase was in-
corporated into the Constitution, the Framers were thinking in terms of
particularized crimes. They were thinking in terms of broad social
interests. Thus it is the role of the courts in this area to determine in
each case whether Congress and the state legislatures intended to protect
the same or different social interests.
The cases in this area break down into several basic categories.
First, there is the situation where the defendant commits one act and
violates one social interest which may be prosecuted by both the state
and federal governments. Bartkus is such a case. The state had a broad
robbery statute"'4 designed to protect all private property within its
jurisdiction. The federal government had a narrow robbery statute13
designed to protect the property placed in depositories within its juris-
diction, namely federally insured banks. Because the federal government
is protecting property placed in'its own instrumentality does not mean
it is protecting a different social interest.3 6 All this means is that the
federal government has jurisdiction to enact the statute. Since the fed-
eral government tried the defendant first, it vindicated the interests of
society against having property illegally taken from a federally insured
bank. When the state later tried the defendant, it vindicated the interests
of society against having property illegally taken. Although the interest
protected by the state is broader, it clearly includes that interest which
the federal government had already vindicated, and thus when the State
of Illinois tried Bartkus after the United States had, it was trying him
for "the same offense." The converse is also true. If the federal govern-
ment had prosecuted after the state, it would have been prosecuting for
a violation of the same social interest.
The same analysis would hold true where the federal government
enacts legislation not to protect its own instrumentalities, but to protect
interstate commerce. For instance, if there is a federal statute proscrib-
ing the transportation of stolen goods in interstate commerce and a state
statute proscribing larceny, a prosecution by one government should bar
the other. Both statutes are protecting private property. The only reason
for the different wording is jurisdictional.
3 7
134. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38 § 501 (1957).
135. 18 U.S.C. § 2113 (1958).
136. The Government in Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 196 (1959) argued
that the fact that a federal instrumentality was involved meant that there were two social
interests.
137. It is assumed that asportation is part of the crime of larceny. If not the case is
harder, but the result should still be the same.
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A second category of cases are those in which the defendant com-
mits one act, but violates several social policies.138 Perhaps the best
example of this is the situation presented in Crossley v. California."3 9
There one Worden derailed a train exclusively engaged in carrying the
United States mail. In the. process he also killed the engineer. In such a
situation, the state ought to be able to prosecute him for murder and the
United States ought to be able to prosecute him for obstructing the mails.
Society has two distinct interests at stake here-the protection of human
life, and the protection of the mails. It is obvious that a federal prosecu-
tion under the mail statute should not bar a state murder prosecution.
However, it could be argued that a state murder trial should bar a later
federal mail prosecution, because the state vindicated the minor social
interest when it tried the defendant for his violation of the major one.
While as a practical matter a United States attorney might take this
view and not prosecute, there should be no constitutional requirement
against such action. Worden was "worse" than a murderer; he was also
an obstructor of the mails. In contrast, Bartkus was "just" a robber. He
was merely unfortunate enough to have robbed a federal instrumentality.
One should note at this point that although multiple trials by state
and federal governments are proper when one act violates two or more
social interests, this should not be so within a single jurisdiction.140 For
instance, a person by means of one act of sexual intercourse, .could violate
a number of different social interests. He could commit incest, adultery,
forced rape, statutory rape, and in some states fornication. However,
the state prosecutor should be required to bring all his theories of the
crime in one trial, because one of the major reasons for the proscription
against double jeopardy is to prevent harassment of the individual by
confronting him with the prospect of multiple trials. 4 '
When there are different governments involved, we cannot require
that all the theories of the action be brought at once. While it is true that
this means that the defendant may be tried more than once, at least the
danger of intentional harassment is not great. If this added factor were
present because of federal-state collusion, then there should be a bar.'42
A problem similar to the one just discussed is that in which one act
138. For a general discussion, see Horack, The Multiple Consequences of a Single
Criminal Act, 21 MINN. L. REV. 805 (1937).
139. 168 U.S. 640 (1898).
140. Mr. Justice Brennan, in a separate opinion in Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S.
187, 196-201 (1959), failed to make any distinction between successive prosecutions by
one government and by two governments. He said that if two governments were allowed
to prosecute when two social interests are violated, it follows that one government must
be able to prosecute twice for the two violations. But, he declares, the latter would violate
the double jeopardy clause. Therefore he concludes that the "social interest" test cannot
be adopted at all!
141. Cf. Commonwealth v. Bishop, 182 Pa. Super. 151, 126 A.2d 533 (1956).
142. The claim of collusion between federal and state authorities was made in Bartkus
v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 123 (1959), but was quickly dismissed.
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results in injuries to different persons or property owned by different
governments. For example, if a person driving an automobile wilfully
strikes and injures two people, one of whom is a federal official and the
other a private citizen, a state could bring an action for assault and
battery for both injuries and punish for both. This would vindicate the
social interest and the federal government would be barred. But if the
state prosecuted only for the assault on the private citizen, the United
States could prosecute for the other assault. The reason for this is that
although only one social interest had been violated, it had been violated
twice even though by means of only one act. Two members of society had
been injured; it makes no difference whether it was by one act or by two.
Thus, multiple prosecutions by different governments in this situation
are constitutionally proper.
For the same reasons as stated above, when discussing the problem
of one act violating several social policies, multiple prosecutions in a
single jurisdiction are improper. All the counts should be brought in one
trial. Although there should be only one trial, multiple punishments are
permissible when different persons or property owned by different persons
are injured. A defendant who has injured two people has done more
social harm than one who has injured only one person and may be
punished accordingly.
143
A more difficult problem arises when both the state and federal
governments proscribe the same act as a crime and give that crime essen-
tially the same name, but in fact the two may be protecting different
social interests. A possible example of this is raised in the Abbate...
case. If the Illinois statute145 for conspiring to destroy property had set
a maximum penalty of three months and the federal penalty for the
same crime was five years, 146 it would be possible to argue that the state
did not consider this particular social interest to be worthy of much
protection. 47 In this situation the federal government should not be
deprived of its jurisdiction to protect what it considers to be an im-
portant interest. Naturally it is difficult for a court to decide at what
point the protection given by one government is so weak that it will
allow a second prosecution, but there are gray areas in all fields of the
law and this, as we have seen, is no exception.
143. A.L.I. supra note 125, § 22, "If a person is acquitted or convicted of an offense,
he shall not again be prosecuted . . . unless the act or acts . . . took effect on more than
one person or the property of more than one person . . . ." But Ci. MODEL PENAL CODE,
§ 1.08 (tent. draft No. 5, 1956) which says that there must be a single prosecution when
"(a) the offenses are based on the same conduct . . . ." The comment says that "same
conduct" clearly includes the case where one act results in injuries to different persons.
However, the MODEL PENAL CODE will not commit itself on the situation where two persons
are injured by two acts in the same time sequence.
144. See also notes 105-09 supra and accompanying text.
145. See note 105 supra.
146. See note 106 supra.
147. In the actual case, the property to be destroyed was not located in Illinois.
Illinois prosecuted for -the crime only because the conspiracy took place there.
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Perhaps a clearer example of this proposition is found in People v.
Welch. 4' The defendant was charged in the state court with the crime of
manslaughter by having feloniously and wilfully propelled a steamboat
in such a way that one Jackson was thrown overboard and drowned.
There was also a federal statute which declared that every person em-
ployed on a steamboat "by whose misconduct, negligence or inattention
to his duties ... the life of any person is destroyed . .. shall be
deemed guilty of manslaughter ..... , Here both governments have
enacted a law on manslaughter yet the federal statute really penalizes
only negligence, while the state law penalizes wilful misconduct.
In such a case, a federal prosecution would not vindicate the social
interest which the state is trying to protect and thus would not act as a
bar. On the other hand, if the state prosecuted first and convicted, it
would vindicate both interests because the social interest, as the federal
government sees it, is necessarily included in the state interest. However,
if the state acquitted the defendant on the wilful misconduct charge, he
might still have been negligent and although the state interest had been
vindicated, the federal interest would not have been. Thus, a state con-
viction will act as a bar to a federal prosecution; a state acquittal will
not, although the defendant should have the benefit of the doctrine of
collateral estoppel 5" in any subsequent prosecution.
This analysis does present the anomaly that if the United States
prosecutes first, there can be two trials, but if the state prosecutes first
and convicts, there can be only one. This problem can be solved at the
single jurisdictional level by requiring the government to bring its
"whole" cause of action at once. However, at the multijurisdictional level
the only solution is to have federal-state cooperation. In the Welch situa-
tion, the most likely solution would be for both governments to agree to
have New York prosecute. Although this appears to be sound, the author
does not contend that it is required by the due process clause. Although
a double prosecution is always harsh, it does not appear that the funda-
mental "concepts of ordered liberty"'' would be violated in this case.
Also some limited protection would be given by the application of col-
lateral estoppel.
Using the same analysis, the courts should be able to handle situa-
tions in which the defendant commits two or more acts in furtherance of
148. 141 N.Y. 266, 36 N.E. 328 (1894).
149. REv. STAT. sec. 5344 (1875). The punishment under this statute is "confinement
at hard labor for a period of not more than ten years." This heavy penalty indicates that
even though the statute only speaks in terms of "negligence," perhaps the courts do look
for some element of wilfullness. However for the purpose of our example, we shall assume
that the federal penalty is very minor.
150. Collateral estoppel is discussed in detail in the text accompanying notes 154-163
infra.
151. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
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his crime. For instance, if a person should rob a private home and the
post office next door, a federal prosecution for the latter robbery will not
bar a state prosecution for the former. The converse is also true. Again
only one social interest is violated-the protection of property, 52 but
it is violated twice. Of course if the state prosecutes for both robberies,
the United States is barred; however, the state can mete out multiple
punishments.1
5
Hence, once the courts discard the archaic notion that just because
two governments have jurisdiction to prosecute for an illegal act, this
means that the act constitutes two offenses, and begin to look to the social
interests violated, many of the obstacles to fair treatment of the indi-
vidual will disappear.
C. The Doctrine of Collateral Estoppel
Once a court decides that two social interests have been violated (or
one social interest has been violated twice) and that successive prosecu-
tions are permissible, the doctrine of collateral estoppel becomes im-
portant. 54
Although this doctrine has long been recognized in the criminal
law,"'55 its principle use has been in civil actions. The rule can be stated
as follows:
Where a question of fact essential to the judgment is actually
litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, the de-
termination is conclusive between the parties [and their privies]
in a subsequent action on a different cause of action ...."'
The first problem that we must face is that in all situations in which we
152. Some might argue that there are two social interests here-the protection of
private property and the protection of public property. The author disputes this on the
grounds that in order for the "social interest" test to be effective, the "social interest" must
be defined broadly. In any event, the purpose of this paper is not to define "social interest"
but merely to show that it can and should be defined.
153. A case similar to the above hypothetical both in facts and results is State v.
Moore, 143 Iowa 240, 121 N.W. 1052 (1909).
154. The topic of collateral estoppel and its relationship to double jeopardy is discussed
in Lugar, Criminal Law, Double Jeopardy and Res Judicata, 39 IOWA L. REv. 317 (1954);
Kirchheimer, The Act, The Offense and Double Jeopardy, 58 YALE L.J. 513, 533 (1949);
Mayers & Yarbrough, Bis Vexari: New Trials and Successive Prosecutions, 74 HARv. L.
Rav. 1, 29 (1960).
155. The leading American case is United States v. Oppenheimer, 242 U.S. 85 (1916).
Technically this case deals only with the doctrine of res judicata. This means that a judg-
ment is conclusive as to every question which was or might have been presented and de-
termined while collateral estoppel refers only to those questions which were actually
litigated and determined. In the criminal field most courts and writers use the term "res
judicata" to refer to both. But cf. Sealfon v. United States, 332 U.S. 575 (1948). For an
excellent discussion of collateral estoppel in civil cases, see Scott, Collateral Estoppel by
Judgment, 56 HARV. L. RaV. 1 (1942).
156. RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 68 (1942); Comment (a) to § 83 declares that not
only parties but those in privity with the parties are bound by and get the benefits of the
rules of res judicata and collateral estoppel. Cf. 2 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS 1322 (5th ed. 1925).
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are concerned the prosecuting parties are different. However as the
author has contended above, each government does not prosecute to
protect its own sovereign interests. Rather each prosecutes to protect
the interests of the same society. If this theory is correct, then the two
governments are in "privity" and thus fall within the scope of the doc-
trine. "Privity" is a word incapable of precise definition. However the
Restatement of Judgments says:
Privity is a word which expresses the idea that as to certain
matters and in certain circumstances persons who are not parties
to an action but who are connected with it in their interests are
affected by the judgment with reference to interests involved
in the action, as if they were parties.
15 7
Even though, by hypothesis, the problem of collateral estoppel should
arise only when the two governments are protecting different interests of
society, it is at the point where. society's two interests converge that the
doctrine is used. Thus it is appropriate to say that the interests which
the federal government desires to protect "are affected by the judgment"
in a prior state action.
Once it is determined that collateral estoppel can be utilized in multi-
jurisdictional prosecutions the next problem to consider is whether or not
the use of that doctrine is constitutionally required. The Court in Hoag
v. New Jersey said:
Despite its wide employment, we entertain grave doubts whether
collateral estoppel can be regarded as a constitutional require-
ment. However, we need not decide that question, for in this
case New Jersey both recognized the rule of collateral estoppel
and considered its applicability to the facts of this case. 5 '
In order to fully explore the constitutional issue, it is necessary to
examine the facts in Hoag. The defendant was tried and acquitted by a
state court for robbery of three persons on the same occasion. Subse-
quently he was tried and convicted for robbing a fourth person during
the same occurrence. Although we have already decided that it is a
violation of due process for a single government to bring two trials in
such an instance, we shall assume for the purpose of this discussion that
the second trial was properly brought by the federal government.
The only controverted fact at the first trial was the identity of the
defendant. The jury acquitted him. At the second trial, he argued that
since it had already been decided that he had not been present at the
scene of the crime, the government was collaterally estopped from
prosecuting him for the other robbery. Although the New Jersey court
accepted the principle of collateral estoppel, they did not apply it in this
157. Id. § 83, comment (a).
158. 356 U.S. 464, 471 (1958).
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case because "there is nothing to show that the jury did not acquit ...
on some other ground or because of a general insufficiency in the State's
proof."'15 In short, since the court could not be sure that the issue had
been "actually litigated and determined" there could be no estoppel.
This decision is based on the recognition of the fact that juries are
often irrational and therefore their verdicts may not have been grounded
in a consideration of the issue in contention. While this may often be
true, the use of this theory completely negates any effectiveness that
collateral estoppel may have, both in criminal and in civil actions. Fur-
thermore, in criminal cases especially, irrational jury verdicts are con-
sidered to be a virtue in that they often temper harsh rules of law. It
seems that the jury trial advantage given to the defendant should not be
taken away from him at a second trial; any controls on jury verdicts
should be by the use of state appeals, not multiple prosecutions.' 60
Thus since only one issue-that of identity-was in contention, the
court should have accepted the proposition that this issue was "actually
determined.' 161 Furthermore the acceptance of this proposition will lead
to better prepared cases on the part of the prosecution because it would
realize that if it fails to convict, another government will be barred from
trying the same issue. Moreover, because collateral estoppel will bar
the second government, there will be less temptation for the losing gov-
ernment to prevail upon the second to bring suit. 2
Without the restrictions the doctrine of collateral estoppel imposes,
a second government would be free to try an issue already decided by
another court and which had not been declared to have been decided
erroneously. Even though the defendant is not being put "twice in
jeopardy for the same offence," he is being tried again for a component
part of that offense and this seems to be contrary to the spirit of the
double jeopardy clause and to the "very essence of a scheme of ordered
liberty."'1 3 If a government is concerned with irrational jury verdicts,
the proper solution once again is to allow the state to appeal, not to
look to a second prosecution by that state or another government.
159. State v. Hoag, 21 N.J. 496, 505, 122 A.2d 628, 632 (1956).
160. See State v. Lawrence, 120 Utah 323, 234 P.2d 600 (1951). On state appeals, see
text accompanying note 173 infra.
161. RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 68 (1942), Comment K suggests that the court look
to the pleadings as evidence of what issues were litigated. There is no suggestion that the
irrationality of jury verdicts be considered.
162. For policy considerations with respect to dual prosecutions by one government
see Mayers & Yarbrough, supra note 154, at 31. A consideration of the difficult problems
involved when there is more than one issue in dispute is beyond the scope of this paper.
For a discussion see Scott, supra note 155, at 10.
163. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
164. A similar argument is made with regard to dual prosecutions by a single govern-
ment in Mayers & Yarbrough, supra note 154, at 39-41; Palko v. Connecticut, supra,
holds that it is not a violation of double jeopardy for a state to appeal a conviction.
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Another question which must be considered is whether the govern-
ment may use collateral estoppel against the defendant-that is, if a de-
fendant is convicted by one sovereign, may the second sovereign, although
prosecuting for a violation for a different social interest, contend that a
component issue has already been decided against the defendant? There
has been some discussion of this point in the federal courts. In United
States v. DeAngelo, 65 the Court declared:
An accused is constitutionally entitled to a trial de novo of the
facts alleged and offered in support of each offense charged
against him and to a jury's independent finding with respect
thereto. But a 'rule of evidence' has been recognized 'which
accords to the accused the right to claim finality with respect to
a fact or group of facts previously determined in his favor
upon a previous trial."66
This case reflects a strong policy that a wrongdoer should not be con-
tinually harassed---even at the expense of disallowing a relatively easy
conviction.167 However it is not so clear that the government should be
constitutionally barred from using collateral estoppel against the de-
fendant. It is the author's opinion that such use of collateral estoppel
would not violate due process of law. Presumably the defendant was
granted a fair chance in the first trial to present his case; while it might
be an added safeguard to allow him to do so again, it would not be
inherently unjust to him if he were barred. On the other hand, if the
defendant can prove actual harassment by the second government such
as repeated threats of prosecution with collateral estoppel effects if the
defendant doesn't "play ball," then he may be able to show a violation
of due process.
If the courts do decide that the government cannot use collateral
estoppel against the defendant, this will raise the question of "mutuality
of estoppel." Briefly stated, the theory is that if one party cannot use
collateral estoppel against the other, the latter will not be able to use it
either. However no reasoning has ever been suggested for this theory.
Furthermore, it has been rejected in both criminal" 8 and civil0 cases.
In summary, it seems that if a defendant has been acquitted on an
issue, it is not very satisfying to say that since he is now being tried
for a violation of a different social interest, he may be tried once again
165. 138 F.2d 466 (3d Cir. 1943) (dictum).
166. Id. at 468; for a discussion of this problem see 27 IowA L. REv. 649 (1942) ; 39
J. Camr. L., C. & P.S. 58 (1948) ; 27 TEXAS L. REv. 231 (1948).
167. Cf. United States v. Waldin, 253 F.2d 551, 557 (3d Cir. 1958) (dissent).
168. United States v. DeAngelo, 138 F.2d 466 (3d Cir. 1943). "Nor can there be any
requirement of mutuality with respect to a criminal judgment's conclusiveness." Id. at 468.
169. The leading civil case rejecting mutuality is Bernhard v. Bank of America, 19
Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942) (Traynor, J.). Cf. 35 YAx L.J. 607 (1925-26).
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on the same issue. Therefore the use of collateral estoppel in favor of a
defendant should be constitutionally required.
VI. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE "SOCIAL INTEREST" TEST
In the first part of this paper, the theoretical justification for per-
mitting successive prosecutions was examined and found to be grounded
in the American conception of federalism. But to examine the reason
why successive prosecutions are allowed is to examine only one side of
the coin. Therefore it must be asked why it is actually done.
Probably the most important reason is that the federal government
70
and some states' 7 ' do not permit the state to appeal because a new trial
would violate the double jeopardy clause of their constitutions. Since
court decisions have placed the state at a disadvantage by not allowing
it to appeal erroneous verdicts, they have decided to right the balance by
allowing second prosecutions through the device of the "same evidence"
test on the single jurisdictional level, 72 and the device of federalism on
the multi-jurisdictional level. This creates the anomalous situation
whereby those jurisdictions which appear to be the most zealous in pro-
tecting individuals against double jeopardy actually cause the most
harassment to the defendant.
If Bartkus and Abbate were overruled, and the "social interest" test
was constitutionally required, this would in effect deprive the federal
and state governments of a substitute for appeal and therefore it is most
likely that they would reestablish state appeals by court decisions178 or
by constitutional amendment. A reestablishment of a right to appeal
would give the state a chance to overturn erroneous verdicts and would
also be fairer to the prisoner than second prosecutions, so long as the
appeal is taken as promptly as possible. 174
Furthermore, even under the "social interest" test, the threat of
successive prosecutions is not eliminated; it is only reduced. A second
government may retry the defendant if the first government failed to
protect a particular social interest. Therefore, in order to give the indi-
vidual maximum protection, the legislatures should enact laws designed
to guarantee the state one full and fair opportunity to try the accused for
170. Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100 (1904). It is unconstitutional for the Gov-
ernment to appeal only after jeopardy has "attached." For a discussion of the "attaching"
of jeopardy see 1 WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE, § 138 (Anderson ed. 1957).
Cf. Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141 (1962) (It is a violation of the double jeopardy
clause to allow the Government to get a writ of mandamus to compel a trial judge to vacate
a directed verdict of acquittal even though he had no power to grant it under the circum-
stances.).
171. E.g., State v. Hand, 6 Ark. 169 (1845). See also A.L.I. ADmnU. o" THE Cim.
LAW: DOUBLE JEOPARDY § 115 (1935).
172. E.g., Blockburger v..United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
173. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
174. For a discussion of state appeals, see Mayers & Yarbrough, supra note 154, at 8.
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violations of all social interests.175 The Model Penal Code set out in the
margin 176 represents an attempt to accomplish such a result.177 It does
so by means of a compulsory joinder of three types of allegations with
an option granted to the court to order a severance when "justice so
requires."
First, all offenses based on the "same conduct" must be tried
together. According to the Comment to the Tentative Draft, 78 the term
"same conduct" has been left to the courts to interpret in light of the
purpose of the section to eliminate undue harassment. It is made clear,
however, that this term does go beyond the "same act." Thus, if two
shots, one immediately following the other, kill two persons, both homi-
cides must be joined in a single trial. Also it is clear that two killings in
unrelated situations could be tried separately. In effect the Code leaves
to the courts the task of deciding just what is an "unrelated situation."
This solution seems to be a sensible one. The state should not have to
prosecute for two murders, two years apart, when the proofs and wit-
nesses will be entirely different. On the other hand, a series of killings
over a period of a month might well be tried at the same time.
Second, paragraph (b) requires that all "necessarily included
offenses" and offenses incidental to the major objective be prosecuted at
the same time. An example of a "necessarily included offense" would be
the felony in a felony-murder prosecution. 1 79 An example of an offense
175. See 65 YALE L.J. 339, 354-68 (1955-56) which discusses Professor Dession's
approach.
176. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.08 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1956). "(2) Requirement of Single
Prosecution. Except as provided in paragraph (3) of this Section, if a person is charged
with two or more offenses and the charges are known to the proper officer of the police or
prosecution and within the jurisdiction of a single court, they must be prosecuted in a
single prosecution when:
(a) the offenses are based on the same conduct; or
(b) the offenses are based on a series of acts or omissions motivated by a purpose
to accomplish a single criminal objective, and necessary or inddental to the accomplish-
ment of that objective; or
(c) the offenses are based on a series of acts or omissions motivated by a common
purpose or plan and which result in the repeated commission of the same offense or
affect the same person or the same persons or the property thereof.
"(3) Relief from Required Joinder. When a person is charged with two or more
offenses, the Court may order any such charge to be tried separately, if it is satisfied that
justice so requires."
In the Model Penal Code (Proposed Official Draft, 1962), section 1.08 has been re-
numbered section 1.07 and the test for required joinder of multiple offenses has been changed.
Rather than the three-fold test described above, section 1.07 (2) states that there shall be
no separate trials for "multiple offenses based on the same conduct or arising from the same
criminal episode . . . ." Unfortunately, the term "criminal episode" covers the same area
as the term "same conduct" and thus in effect, section 1.08 (2) (b) and (c) has been deleted.
177. Professor Wechsler, Reporter for the MODEL PENAL CODE, said, "[T]his has been
designed to cast the balance in favor of cleaning up the charges against a particular man
at one time, in the view that 'he is only one man, and that however many things he has
done the slate ought so far as possible to be cleaned so that he may be dealt with as the
one man that he is, and appropriately disposed of." 33 A.L.I. PROCEEDINGS 139 (1956).
178. MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 176, at 36-37.
179. See State v. Mowser, 92 N.J.L. 474, 106 Atl. 416 (1919).
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that is not "necessarily included" but one that is often a part of a crime
is a kidnapping incidental to a robbery. Often a person is kidnapped in
order to rob him, but kidnapping is not one of the essential elements of
the crime of robbery. In any event the Code treats both situations the
same because successive prosecutions of a defendant should not turn on
what the technical elements of a crime happen to be.
Paragraph (c) deals with two situations: one, in which the defendant
repeatedly violates the same statute either against the same or different
persons; and two, in which the defendant's acts affect the same person
or his property but the offenses are different. In both situations joinder
is required only if the offenses were motivated by a common purpose or
plan. The purpose of this section is to provide that all "continuing"
offenses be tried at the same time. For example, if a statute prohibits the
exercise of a trade on Sunday, and the defendant storekeeper sells 200
articles, this is one continuing offense rather than 200 distinct offenses,
because the sale of all the articles constitutes only one illegal "exercise
of a trade."'80 However, the Code goes a bit further. It would consider
an act to be a continuing offense even if the statute violated were written
in narrower terms than the one above. For instance, in O'Neil v. United
States,"" defendant embezzled 831 letters from the United States mail,
thus violating a federal statute 82 punishing the embezzlement of any
letter. The Code, as did the O'Neil case, would say that even though
technically the statute creates a separate crime for each letter taken, in
fact there was only one criminal purpose or plan and thus there can only
be one trial.
According to O'Neil, not only is it constitutionally required to bring
all the counts at one trial, but it would be a violation of due process to
provide for multiple punishments because the taking of all these letters,
even though it was done over a nine day period and the letters belonged
to different persons, constituted but one "continuing intent." Although
the author has contended above that multiple punishments are proper
when different persons or different property is involved, in situations when
each renewed injury is inflicted in a purely mechanical manner without
any additional thought on the part of a "reasonable man," then multiple
punishments would be improper. s8
Although this statute if interpreted liberally by the courts will go
a long way to protect a defendant from successive prosecutions by his
180. See Ebeling v. Morgan, 237 U.S. 625, 630 (1915) (dictum).
181. 236 F.2d 636 (6th Cir. 1956).
182. 18 U.S.C. § 1709 (1958). "Whoever . . . embezzles any letter . . . shall be fined
or imprisoned . .. ."
183. Since the problem of multiple punishments is common not only to prosecutions
by different governments, but to successive prosecutions by one jurisdiction, a full dis-




own state, its operation in certain circumstances will not prevent the
federal government from prosecuting for a particular violation if the
state failed to do so. The basic scheme of the statute is that if the state
fails to join the required items, it is barred from prosecuting later.
18 4
There is no provision whereby the defendant can require that the state
prosecute him for all offenses at once. For example, if the defendant
passes five bad checks, the fifth of which was given to a federal official,
but the state only knows about the first four, can the defendant also re-
quire prosecution on the fifth? This question was raised at the Annual
Meeting of the American Law Institute in 1956, and Professor Wechsler,
the Reporter, indicated that the defendant could so require.85 However,
if a court should hold that he could not, the federal government could
prosecute on the fifth check, on the theory that the same social interest
was violated more than once and not vindicated in the prior prosecution.
Therefore the Code should specifically provide that the defendant has
a right to require prosecution of all offenses referred to therein. Of course
if he should fail to do so, then a federal prosecution would be at his own
peril.
In order to further protect the defendant from successive prosecu-
tions and also to increase the efficiency of criminal proceedings, a juris-
diction should provide for liberal amendment procedures for the prosecu-
tion. For instance in the bad check case above, if the prosecution did not
learn of the check given to the federal official until after the indictment,
it ought to be able to amend without reconvening the grand jury. The
argument to the contrary is that if grand jury approval is necessary for
indictments, any amendment as to substance also has to be submitted
to a grand jury.'86 However, according to Kirchheimer,87 the grand jury
is only interested in the broadest and most cursory outlines of the facts
presented by the district attorney. It does not go into details of evidence
nor concern itself with the various theories under which a case may be
presented. He concludes by declaring that in light of these considerations,
amendment variances should be prohibited only "where there exists a
reasonable presumption that the grand jury might not have brought the
particular indictment if the amended version had been originally pre-
sented to it."'x8
If such a theory is adopted by the jurisdiction, it will greatly enhance
the likelihood that violations of all social interests will be tried in one
action and thus bar a retrial by a second jurisdiction. Of course if the
184. MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 183, § 1.09(1) (b).
185. 33 ALI PROCEEDINGS supra note 177, at 155-56.
186. Commonwealth v. Snow, 269 Mass. 598, 169 N.E. 542 (1930). Cf. Ex parte Bain,
121 U.S. 1 (1886).
187. Kirchheimer, The Act, The Offense and Double Jeopardy, 58 YALE L.J. 513, 534
(1949).
188. Id. at 538.
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defendant can convince the court that trial of all offenses will be prejudi-
cial to him he may ask for a severance.189 The severance procedure
should require the state to bring the second trial as soon as possible
after the conclusion of the first.
VII. PRESENT AND PROPOSED LEGISLATION DESIGNED TO PREVENT
SUCCESSIVE PROSECUTIONS BY DIFFERENT GOVERNMENTS
Although eighteen states' 90 have statutes designed to bar successive
prosecutions, these statutes have rarely been used, 9 ' and when they have
been, the courts have, to a great extent, nullified their effectiveness.
New York has two statutes on the subject, one which creates a
defense' 92 and one which creates a procedural bar;19 the wording of
both is ambiguous, and the New York courts have exploited this defect
to the extent that the defense is almost worthless. For example, in People
v. Adamchesky,'9 4 the defendant was indicted for grand larceny for the
theft of a truckload of cigarettes. He had previously been convicted of
violating a federal statute 95 making illegal the transportation of stolen
merchandise in interstate commerce. He pleaded both Penal Law section
33 and section 139 of the Code of Criminal Procedure as a defense.
The court dealt with each section separately. As to Penal Law sec-
tion 33 the court stressed the word "offense." It said that the offense of
189. MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 176, § 1.07(3).
190. ALASKA COMP. LAWS ANN. § 66-3-4 (1949) (Because Alaska was a territory when
law was enacted, it does not bar prosecutions by the federal government. That presumably
was left to the fifth amendment.); ARIZ. CODE ANN. § 43-6102 (1939); CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 656; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-315 (1948); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38 § 601.1 (1959) (This was
enacted shortly after Bartkus and Abbate were decided) ; IND. STAT. ANN. § 9-215 (Burns
1933); MINN. STAT. § 610.23 (1947); Miss. 'CODE ANN. § 2432 (1942); MONT. REV. CODES
ANN. § 94-4703 (1947); NEV. Comp. LAWS § 9963 (Hillyer 1929); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 33
and N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 139; N.D. REV. CODE § 12-0505 (1943); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 21, § 25, tit. 22, § 130 (1951); ORE. REV. STAT. § 131.240(1) (1953); S.D. CODE
§ 13,0506, 34-0813 (1939); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-25, 77-8-8 (1953); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 10.43.040 (1951); WIS. STAT. § 939.71 (1955). Cf. TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 208
(1954).
191. Although many of these statutes date back to the ninteenth century (e.g.,
Minn.-1894, Mont.-1895) in only two states has there been much lltigation,-New York
where there has been a statute since 1816 [For history see People v. Mignogna, 54 N.Y.S.2d
233 (Queens County Ct. 1945)] and California where legislation has existed since 1872.
192. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 33 "Whenever it appears upon the trial of an indictment,
that the offense was committed in another state or country, or under such circumstances
that the courts of this state or government had jurisdiction thereof, and that the defendant
has already been acquitted or convicted on the merits upon a criminal prosecution under
the laws of such state or country, founded upon the act or omission in respect to which
he is upon trial, such former acquittal or conviction is a sufficient defense." (Emphasis
supplied.)
193. N.Y. CODE CRrM. PROC. § 139. "When an act charged as a crime is within the
jurisdiction of another state, territory or country, as well as within the jurisdiction of this
state, a conviction or acquittal thereof in the former, is a bar to a prosecution or indict-
ment thereof in this state." (Emphasis supplied.)
194. 184 Misc. 769, 55 N.Y.S.2d 90 (1945).
195. IS U.S.C. 2314 (1958).
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grand larceny was different from that of transporting stolen merchandise.
It failed to consider that asportation may be part of the crime of larceny,
and also that the federal statute is worded in terms of "transportation"
only to surmount jurisdictional difficulties. It did not mention that section
33 speaks not only in terms of "offenses" but also in terms of "acts."
However, it did get to this question in its discussion of the Code
of Criminal Procedure, section 139. The court held that the "act" of
taking was committed solely within the jurisdiction of New York, and
thus section 139 did not apply.'96 Again, had the court been interested
in carrying out the purpose of the statute, it would have construed the
term "act" to embrace the asportation incidental to it. Even in the one
New York case which held that the statute did bar a second prosecution,
the court construed the statute as narrowly as possible, using the "same
evidence" test to determine if the offenses were the same.9 7
Even though the barriers against successive state and federal prosecu-
tions set up by the New York legislature were weak, in 1962 a decision
came down which rendered them totally valueless. In People v. Lo-
Cicero, 1 7a the court held that the phrase "another ...country" found
in the New York statutes did not refer to the federal government. The
result is that New York cannot prosecute a defendant after a prosecution
for the same act by another state, territory or foreign country, but that
in the most important situation of all, following a federal prosecution,
the state is free to place the defendant in jeopardy once again.
The interpretation of the California Penal Code, section 6 5 6,19s
points out most graphically that these statutes are practically "dead
letters." One, Candelaria, was tried and convicted in a federal court for
robbing a federally insured bank.' 99 He was then tried for robbery under
California law.10 However, the court said that both robberies were
"founded upon the same act," that is, the "physical act . . .of de-
fendant in taking the money," and therefore section 656 constituted a
defense.
But the State of California was undaunted. It then prosecuted
Candelaria for burglary in the first degree. 20 1 This time the court held:
The provisions of section 656 of the Penal Code [are not] of
196. Accord, People ex rel. Helfin v. Silberglett, 2 App. Div. 2d 767, 153 N.Y.S.2d 279
(1956); People v. Mignogna, 54 N.Y.S.2d 233 (Queens County Ct. 1945).
197. People v. Eklof, 179 Misc. 536, 41 N.Y.S.2d 557 (1942).
197a. 17 App. Div. 2d 31, 230 N.Y.S.2d 384 (1962).
198. CAL. PENAL CODE § 656 "Whenever on the trial of an accused person it appears
that upon a criminal prosecution under the laws of another state, government, or country,
founded upon the act or omission in respect to which he is on trial, he has been acquitted
or convicted, it is a sufficient defense."
199. United States v. Candelaria, 131 F. Supp. 797 (S.D. Cal. 1955).
200. People v. Candelria, 139 Cal. App. 2d 432, 294 P.2d 120 (1956).
201. People v. Candelaria, 153 Cal. App. 2d 879, 315 P.2d 386 (1957).
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any assistance to the defendant in this proceeding, for that
section provides . . . that the federal prosecution for robbery
is a bar to a further prosecution for the robbery, but not other-
wise. The 'act' spoken of in the statute must be 'the same act.'
The burglary act . . . in the present case, that is, the entering
of the building with the intent to commit a theft, is not the
same act complained of in the federal court, namely, that he
pointed a gun at the teller and by force and fear compelled
her to deliver . . . certain monies. 2
Thus the net result of these statutes is to eliminate the theory that an
act committed within the jurisdiction of two sovereigns is automatically
two offenses. But that is all. The courts then go on to deal with the
problem exactly as they do on the single jurisdictional level. If proof of
one fact in one prosecution is different, from a fact proved in the other,
then there must be a different "act" or "offense" as the case may be. In
short, the defendant gets the minimal protection against double jeopardy.
On the other hand, the Model Penal Code set out in the margin' 3
does grant the defendant some real protection. Basically the statute
operates on two levels. First, section 1.10, paragraph (1) (a) grants the
defendant at least minimal protection by adopting the "same evidence"
test used by the majority of jurisdictions.0 4 However paragraph (1) (a)
goes one step further. It states that even though one offense may require
proof of facts not required by another, prosecution for one offense will
still bar prosecution for the other, if both offenses were intended to
prevent substantially the same harm or evil. By adding this new test,
the Model Penal Code will force the courts to examine, not merely the
technical elements of the offenses committed, but also the interests of
society which may have been violated.
Secondly, once the court has made its determinations on the above
stated issues, it must then decide whether the subsequent prosecution
202. Id. at 884, 315 P.2d at 389.
203. MODEL PENAL CODE, sec. 1.10 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962). "When conduct
constitutes an offense within the concurrent jurisdiction of this State and of the United
States or another State, a prosecution in any such other jurisdiction is a bar to a subsequent
prosecution in this State under the following circumstances:
(1) The first prosecution resulted in an acquittal or in a conviction as defined
in Section 1.08 and the subsequent prosecution is based on the same conduct, unless
(a) the offense of which the defendant was formerly convicted or acquitted and the
offense for which he is subsequently prosecuted each requires proof of a fact not
required by the other and the law defining each of such offenses is intended to
prevent a substantially different harm or evil or (b) the second offense was not
consummated when the former trial began; or
(2) The former prosecution was terminated, after the information was filed
or the indictment found, by an acquittal or by a final order or judgment for the
defendant which has not been set aside, reversed or vacated and which acquittal,
final order or judgment necessarily required a determination inconsistent with
a fact which must be established for conviction of the offense of which the de-
fendant is subsequently prosecuted."
204. Cf. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
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is based on the same conduct as the first. This is the same test used in
both section 1.08 (2) (a) of the tentative draft and in the revised section
1.07 (2) of the proposed official draft. 0 5 As we have seen in our con-
sideration of that section, the "same conduct" test gives the courts some
leeway to expand that test to the point of adopting a true "same transac-
tion" test. In the words of the Reporter, Professor Wechsler:
[T] he purpose is to give the courts some leeway to expand
the scope of the protection in dealing with criminality if it
involves a succession of acts, but to do so in relation to what it
conceives to be the policy of double jeopardy, and on balanc-
ing of interest, that of course is called for.206
Finally, in paragraph (2), the Code sets forth the principle of collateral
estoppel.
Since the code is drafted in such a flexible manner, it is conceivable
that it might grant more protection to the defendant than that which is
constitutionally required by the social interest test, in this writer's opin-
ion. This would be accomplished if the courts interpret the phrase "same
conduct" in such a manner as to bar a second prosecution even if a dif-
ferent social interest was violated. Such a test would mean that the courts
would look at the whole "transaction" and if the defendants were pros-
ecuted for part of it, that would be a sufficient bar. However, this seems
unlikely, since the courts are notorious for their narrow interpretations
in this field. If section 1.10 has real value, it lies in its restatement of the
"same evidence" test. By abandoning the purely mechanical examination
of minor factual differences between offenses and requiring the courts to
examine the substantive differences, the Code may force the courts to
accept some type of social interest test. Finally, section 1.10 (2) adopts
the collateral estoppel doctrine, which does grant protection, provided the
courts assume that the jury in the first trial decided the case rationally on
the basis of the issues in dispute.0 7
On April 8, 1959, one week after Bartkus and Abbate were decided,
a bill designed to overrule them was introduced in the House of Repre-
sentatives, where it died in the Judiciary Committee. Nevertheless its
contents are of interest? °8 First, it forbids prosecution by a state after
205. MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 176.
206. 33 ALI PROCEEDINGS 157 (1956).
207. See note 160 supra, and accompanying text.
208. H.R. 6176, 86th Cong. 1st Sess. (1959), "A bill to amend title 18 U.S.C. chap. 211
by adding the following new section.
sec. 3244. Prior adjudication of any court of competence, State or Federal, on the
merits; bar to prosecution for similar act committed against same person and State."
"An adjudication on the merits by a competent State or Federal court of an act com-
mitted against a person or State, which same act also constitutes a like offense against the
same person and state under any jurisdiction, State or Federal, other than the jurisdiction
for which said adjudication was made, shall be a bar to any further or other prosecution
for the same act committed against the same person and state."
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a federal prosecution2' 9 and vice-versa. Second, since Congress has
granted certain states concurrent jurisdiction over crimes on their com-
mon borders,210 it bars a prosecution by one state after another state.
Since Congress does not have the constitutional power, it could not
require that a state not prosecute a man it had once tried before; there-
fore that is specifically excepted. However the bill does not forbid the
federal government from prosecuting a man for the same act for which
it had previously prosecuted him. This could be because there is dictum
in Abbate which indicates that retrial in such an instance would be a
violation of the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment.2 11 Again
the primary objection to the bill is that it refers to the "same act." Since
the courts are quick to find two separate "acts," this protection is not
adequate.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter in the Bartkus1 2 case specifically left the
problem of preventing successive prosecutions to the states. However,
although a sizeable number of state legislatures had acted prior to this
decision and Illinois followed suit afterward,2 18 the statutes do not give
comprehensive coverage and the courts have failed to apply the statutes
in any meaningful way.
VIII. CONCLUSION
As noted, the courts have been struggling to find some means to
justify successive prosecutions by different governments. They have
evolved various theories and tests, none of which is particularly satisfy-
ing. On the other hand, the early decisions were motivated by a very real
concern-the preservation of state sovereignty in a federal system. How-
ever, in these cases,214 the individual was not actually being prosecuted
twice and the political turmoil of the time justified the results.
In the twentieth century, on the other hand, when individual rights
were squarely at issue, the courts could have adopted a rule that the first
sovereign to prosecute would bar the other. This solution would have
maintained state sovereignty and yet given protection to the defendant.
Nevertheless, the courts adopted the old theories in toto.
Although the reasons for this have not been articulated by the
courts, it seems that they lay in the courts' dissatisfaction with state
criminal procedures, in that the government is often placed at an unfair
disadvantage. In many jurisdictions the state cannot appeal and the
209. This intereference with state criminal procedures by Congress is of doubtful
constitutionality.
210. See Nielsen v. Oregon, 212 U.S. 315 (1919).
211. Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 197 (1959).
212. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 138 (1959).
213. See note 190 supra.
214. E.g., Moore v. Illinois, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 13 (1852); United States v. Marigold,
50 U.S. (9 How.) 560 (1850).
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prosecutor cannot add to the indictment without reconvening the grand
jury. The courts have reacted to this situation by treating the problem
of double jeopardy subjectively. If after examining all the circumstances,
the court believes that the defendant was acquitted because of a techni-
cality, or convicted on a count which in the court's opinion did not fit
the magnitude of the crime, it will allow a second prosecution.
If this analysis is correct, then in a given case, "justice" may actu-
ally have been done even though that fact could not have been discerned
from the opinion. Nevertheless one of the most cherished principles of
Anglo-American law has been that of a "government of laws and not of
men." The ideal which has always been sought has been the "objective
standard" which will yield predictable results. Human frailty is such
that this ideal is rarely achieved, but this does not mean that the search
should be abandoned. So in the area of double jeopardy, where the
courts should be trying to balance the rights of the individual against
the rights of the state, it is incumbent upon them to lay down some basic
guidelines. It is hoped that the suggestiom made in this paper will aid
in this endeavor.
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